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Lessons Gleaned from the Political Participation of Children in Bahrain Uprising 
 






Reflecting the tension between state sovereignty and human rights, this paper discusses 
the moral and ethical implications of the political participation and detention of Bahraini children 
against the backdrop of sectarian geopolitics. Drawing methodological insights from 
postmodernism, this paper argues that reading of Bahraini children as political subjects are 
objectified and reified with truth claims, which ascribes them a minoritized status based on age 
and sect. This paper is interdisciplinary in its approach and is three-pronged: First, it begins by 
providing a contextual analysis of sectarian politics and dichotomous discourses of national 
sovereignty and human rights. Secondly, this paper juxtaposes competing definitions of violence 
in reference to child psychology and human rights literature. Thirdly, this paper looks at 
dialectics of natural rights from a postmodern anti-humanist lens by examining inter-subjective 
discursive formations ascribed to the legitimacy of children’s participation in civil disobedience, 
and concludes with a few thoughts on the implications of the protracted political deadlock on 
children’s rights. 
 




The uprising in Bahrain since February 14
th
 of 2011 has been primarily framed in a 
polemic rhetoric due to demographic imbalance and geopolitical tensions with Iran that drove the 
sectarian rift. Shi’a protests are galvanised around issues of socioeconomic grievances, structural 
inequality, and political marginalisation (Kinninmont, 2012; Jones, 2007). Major outbreaks of 
social unrest dates back to the 1920s with political grievances aired against lack of follow-
through on delivering constitutional reform of an elected unicameral parliament (Ulrichsen, 2012; 
Downs, 2012). In response to heavy-handed clampdown on protests, the Feburary 14
th
 revolution 
has been rebranded as the Tamarod movement, which is modelled after the Egyptian grassroots 
movement in 2013. Sectarianism plays an imperative role in fuelling tension in domestic politics 
with major geopolitical repercussions, due to a combination of factors including the historic 
claim of Bahrain being Iran’s 14th province and the sizable presence of the Persian community in 
Bahrain (Belfer, 2011). For that reason, the pro-democracy uprising rallied across predominantly 
Shi’a areas has been framed as the ‘Shi’a struggle’ by hypostatising Iranian threat. Black-and-
white perceptions of sectarian politics provide the pretext for government clampdown on anti-
government protests that alienates the Shi’a majority all the while barring efforts to achieve 
national unity. While the sectarian framing of the political crisis in Bahrain renders questioning 
legitimacy on all sides, political participation of minor children merits further attention; this is 
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poignant given the impact of youth bulge
2
 and the rise of children’s participation in illegal 
protests and detention. 
While the investigation led by the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) in 
2011 was commended for detailed documentation of gross human violations, it nevertheless has 
drawn criticisms due to lack of accountability (Kinninmont, 2012). Bahraini politics is at the 
crossroads as of writing amid the suspension of national dialogue that commenced since 2011. 
Against the backdrop of sectarian geopolitics, this paper examines the moral and ethical 
implications of participation rights of Bahraini children in illegal gatherings from a 
postmodernist lens. Noting the escalation in violent exchanges between the riot police and 
children and the rise in detention and casualty rates of Bahraini children, I highlight the inherent 
tension between natural rights and participation rights delineated in the child psychology and 
human rights literature. In this paper I contend that Bahraini minors are deprived of their political 
agency and ascribed a minoritized status based on age and sect due to their exposure to violence 
as they are caught between competing political agendas sought by two opposing camps. 
 
 
The Tension between State Sovereignty and Human Rights 
Despite the prevalence of political participation of minors in Bahrain, participation rights 
of children is seldom under the limelight, and when it is, it is usually reported through human 
rights NGOs, or other unofficial channels such as blogs and social networking sites. With the 
exception of the BICI report that sheds some light on the mistreatment, abduction, and 
kidnapping of children participating in anti-government protests, official statistics on the 
participation and detention rate of children is virtually non-existent. 
Notwithstanding the dearth of research, it is highlighted in the BICI report (2011) that 
protesters under the age of 18, and in some cases, under the age of 15, were detained for 
participating in demonstrations in Shia predominant villages of Sitra, Sanabis, Karbabad, 
Karzakan, Issa Town and Hamad Town, and were subject to harsh treatments. In August 2010, 
Bahrain Centre for Human Rights found that 76 children were arrested including a ten-year-old 
child during political unrest. Likewise in the same year, children comprise 21 percent of the total 
of 355 cases of detentions. 
Considering that there are no official statistics that are up-to-date, since the advent of the 
Arab Spring, credibility of the source may be questioned. Nevertheless, the sheer scale of the 
imprisonment of children captured in 2010 tellingly reflects the prevalence of political 
participation of minors in Bahrain. Amnesty International (2013)
3
 reported that ten year prison 
sentence was ordered to two 16-year-old Bahraini boys, Jehad Sadeq ‘Aziz Salman and Ebrahim 
Ahmed Radi al-Moqdad for allegedly ‘intending to murder policemen’ and undermining public 
security. It is suspected that ever since the heightening of the political tension in 2011, there are 
many cases similar to these that are underreported. 
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 Amnesty International (2013)
4
 and Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights (2012)
5
, 
among many others, have condemned the mistreatment of children, especially cases where 
children and youth were held in the same detention centres as adult prisoners and being subject 
to unfair trials in criminal court. In addition, as of September 2013, Amnesty International stated 
that children are charged with criminal offenses under the penal code and anti-terrorism law. The 
participation of children in protests, mostly in the form of hurling Molotov cocktails and burning 
tyres are executed to demand political reform and release of political prisoners from detention. 
Albeit the legitimate concerns of the ill treatment of children and youth under the pro-democracy 
agenda, the increasing exposure of Bahraini children to violence is regarded problematic as they 
are often perceived as proxy participants of the broader political uprising since 2011. The 
unintended repercussions of this ordeal entail robbing children of their agency and rights to 
protection while the detention and casualty rates are on the rise. For this reason, children and 
youth participants in anti-government protests, much like their adult counterparts, are perceived 
as security threats. 
Accordingly, child rights to participation in Bahrain should be situated in the broader 
political context due to the sectarian framing of the conflict. The intractable political crisis 
concentrated in the Shi’a predominant areas suggests that Shi’a protestors are perceived as 
posing serious threats to the national security. In addition to the revocation of the citizenship of 
31 Bahraini activists under the stipulation of article 10 of the citizenship law in 2012, Maclean 
and Webb (2013) found that eight Bahraini nationals were found guilty for being involved in 
terrorist cell charges with alleged links to Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon
6
. Escalating tension is 
evidenced by the violent clashes between the security force and protestors culminating in rising 
casualties on both sides and the incarceration of activists notably, children and youth. The use of 
petrol bombs, Molotov cocktails, and tire burning by protesters and the concomitant firing of tear 
gas canisters by the security force are some illustrative examples. 
The political impasse against the backdrop of intensifying violence inexorably invokes 
the question of security dilemma in a country where the Sunni monarchy rules the Shi’a majority. 
Bahrain emerges as the sectarian battleground with the Shi’a protesters staging a protest against 
the incumbent regime. The political interests at stake for the Shi’a opposition are at odds with 
national security interests and are mirrored on the civil unrest at the national scale. Throughout 
the progression of the uprising, the pearl roundabout, the graffiti strewn across the walls and 
public properties, and black flags and veneration of Shi’a imams and saints that bear symbolic 
significance of Shi’a solidarity (Nasr, 2007). These developments corroborate the postulation 
that Bahraini upheaval is a microcosm of the broader geopolitical spectre of the Shi’a uprising. 
Nasr posit that the traditional parameters of defining nation-state is increasingly destabilised as 
he conceives of a transnational Shi’a movement that transcends the Westphalian notion of 
nation-state emanating from territorial sovereignty. In fact, readers are compelled to rethink the 
conventional notions of nationalism, sovereignty, and human rights as McLeod (2010), Longva 
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(1997), and Anderson (1983) insinuate that the imperialist root of nation-state and citizenship are 
social constructs. 
The Westphalian notion of sovereignty frequently referenced in the international human 
rights literature underlying the legal normative approach has been challenged in the post-
Westphalian international order (Krasner, 1995). These claims are germane given the ushering of 
neoliberalism since the 1970s highlighted in the political economy literature that offsets the 
traditional realist premises of Westphalian territorial sovereignty (Falk, 2002; Krasner, 2001). 
The assumption of liberal democratic theorists and cosmopolitan theorists suggesting that the 
locus of sovereignty and decision-making has moved away from national governments (Held, 
1997; Dryzek, 2006), is reflected on the resolution passed by the European parliament on 
September 12, 2013 that urged the Bahraini government to honour human rights, including the 
rights of the juveniles, and the fundamental rights to freedom of expression. Nonetheless, 
cosmopolitanism remains a radical assumption in view of the transitional democracies or other 
non-democratic political systems today. 
Cohen (2008) asserts that “sovereign equality and human rights are two distinct but 
interrelated legal principles of the same, dualistic international system and both are needed to 
construct a more just version of that system (p. 579)”. Yet in comparison to humanitarian rights 
law, human rights law carries less of an imperative. In fact, the inception of the human rights 
treaties and conventions in the aftermath of the Second World War was not intended for political 
commitment but as “soft-law” documents that are purely aspirational and justiciable” (Cole, 
2009, p. 565). 
While Bahrain is a party to UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, it follows that 
there are legal loopholes act as an impediment as enshrining human rights in Arab constitutions 
are merely regarded as a routine or decorative procedure (al-Nasser, 1989 as cited in Hassassian, 
2000 in eds. Butchenson, Davis, and Hassassian, 2000). It is legal recognition of children’s rights, 
as opposed to soft law, that leaves an important legacy as it gives legitimacy to children’s rights 
and hence agency (Freeman, 2011 as cited in Flekkøy and Kaufman, 1997). Noting the gap 
between implementation and enforcement, cosmopolitan theorists Beitz (2005) and Putzel (2005) 
are more precautionary in their approaches: cosmopolitanism appears a far-fetched idea at the 
moment due to the lack of appetite for the international community to recognize civil and 
political rights. 
As such, the opposition coalition is bolstered through transnational networks of political 
Islam. This is a throwback of the sectarian-based loyalties in the 1980s and the broad appeal of 
Ayatollah Khomeini (Gause, 1994). Thus the expansion of transnational networks could be a 
boon or bane contingent on state legitimacy: in a state with weak legitimacy, cohesive 
transnational religious networks erode regime legitimacy (Beitz, 1999). 
Inevitably, contending visions exist between the state and the opposition movement 
regarding state-policing: on the one hand, it is legitimized for maintaining order and discipline 
and on the other hand, it is de-legitimized against the opposition efforts to push for political 
reforms. Fundamentally when state legitimacy is brought into question, those challenging state 
authority are no longer under the protection of the security apparatus, but are viewed as sources 
of threat. 
Whether it be consolidating a Bahraini model of Shiism or simply introducing a 
sectarian-neutral pro-democracy initiative, political conundrum in Bahrain is framed in 
antagonistic terms that necessarily pit the incumbent regime against the opposition coalition. The 
security dilemma exemplified above encapsulates the deep-seated mistrust between both parties. 
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The political stalemate in Bahrain resonates with Newman (in eds. Green, 2002, p. 78-9) in 
retorting that “greater threat may come from their own state itself, rather than from an external 
adversary”. 
The opposition movement is thus rooted on an informal support base. The decision of the 
deputy chairman of the elected chamber to meet with Sheikh Isa to convince the boycotters to 
vote in the next election by bypassing formal politics implies that Shiite clerics occupy an 
influential position in the opposition movement (Freedom House, 2011; Nasr, 2006). Media 
spotlight has been shed on the influence of Bahraini Shiite clerics Ayatollah Shiekh Isa Al 
Qassim and Sheikh Isa Qassim and high-profile human rights activists, Abdulhadi Al Khawaja 
and Nabeel Rajab for fomenting dissent. 
Branding of internal dissenters as ‘terrorists’ and ‘foreign agents’ by virtue of disloyalty 
tacitly assumes mutual exclusivity between national and political security—the latter of which 
connotes civil and political rights. The identity-based framing of the political crisis that 
inevitably sets itself up against the inculcation of the security narrative officially promoted by the 
state, inextricably invokes questions of state sovereignty and loyalty. The tension between the 
two makes it susceptible for Bahraini children in Shiite neighbourhoods to become easy targets 
during times of political unrest. Bahraini Shiite children often acting on behalf of the adults in 
their neighbourhood as proxy political participants are often misconstrued as enjoying 
widespread impunity. Right to Education Project (2001), cites the legal minimum age for 
criminal responsibility for children as follows: 
 
 Article 32 of the Bahrain Penal Code of 1976 stipulates that a person under 15 
years of age cannot be held responsible for the commission of an act constituting 
an offence, being liable solely to the measures provided for in the Juveniles Act.  
 Article 101 of the Penal Code further stipulates that the provisions concerning 
permissibility, causation and impediments to responsibility, as contained in 
chapter II concerning criminal responsibility, also apply to minor infractions of 
the law. 
 
While detention, abduction, and torture of children elicit negative public responses, 
political participation of minors are not taken seriously due to their legal age. Exposure to violent 
protest recruits the hit-and-run tactic -- including vandalism of public properties, burning tyres, 
blocking roads, and hurling Molotov cocktails, just to name a few, and is seen as an easy way out 
for adults who often wish to engage in civil disobedience but are often reluctant to do it 
themselves. By recruiting children and youth, the adult protesters enjoy anonymity and impunity 
themselves while putting children’s life at risk and jeopardising security. 
What compounds the problem is the antagonism between minor children in the 
opposition and foreign mercenaries of the Sunni sect that mirrors the broader domestic political 
crisis. The Guardian reveals that the use of force among riot police foments hostility due to the 
recruitment of mercenaries of the Sunni sect as riot police as a means to offset demographic 
imbalance
7
. Yet beyond the grand sectarian narrative, the issue is rather complicated contrary to 
the common presuppositions, as branding the conflict ‘sectarian’ does not do justice to any party 
involved. The umbrella of human rights subsumes the notion that there is an inherent tension 
between natural rights and rights to resistance. Hobbesian notion of natural rights assumes that 
                                                             
7 Black, Ian. "Bahrain Security Forces Accused of Deliberately Recruiting Foreign Nationals." The Guardian. 
Guardian News and Media, 17 Feb. 2011. Web. 30 Oct. 2013. 
55 
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 14, No. 5  December 2013 
individuals have a right to self-preservation. In Leviathan, Hobbes (1961) identifies rights of 
non-incrimination, enjoyment of the means of life, resistance, and self-defence, among many 
others, as inalienable rights. However, rights to resistance and self-defence are incompatible in 
light of the civil unrest in Bahrain. Neither the minor perpetrators and the legal guardians nor the 
riot police and the government is vindicated as Bahraini children are culpable of undermining 
public security while riot police are equally criticised for their heavy-handed clampdown and use 
of force, especially with the use of teargas canisters, shotgun pellets and petrol bombs
8
. Given 
the disagreements over what constitutes human rights violation and civil disobedience, what 
follows is an overview of the conceptual parameters of youth resistance and legitimation of 
violence. 
The involvement of minors in civil disobedience and Sunni foreign riot police in the 
uprising sparks tension and feeds the vicious cycle of violence and counter-violence as 
conflicting claims are made regarding self-defence and human rights transgressions. The death of 
Qassim Habib, an eight-year-old boy killed by a tear gas canister fired by the riot police, is a 
case-in-point (ADHRB, 2013). Furthermore, media coverage has the unintended effect of 
bolstering the opposition cause by giving them exposure to media publicity. For instance, Al 
Jazeera’s coverage of the imprisonment of an 11-year-old boy, Ali Hassan detained in adult 
prison drew widespread international criticism
9
. 
Hollander and Einwohner (2004) suggest that resistance is predicated upon principles of 
recognition and intent. They identify seven typologies of resistance grounded on mode of 
resistance; scale of resistance; level of coordination; targets of resistance; direction or goals of 
resistance; political action; and identity-based resistance. Upon considering the conflict in 
Bahrain, the intent and legitimization of the mode(s) of resistance are disputable. Mode of 
violence in the Bahraini uprising is inextricably interlinked with the debate on violence. 
According to Virginia Held (1997), violence is defined as “predictable, coercive, and sudden 
infliction of injury or harming persons (p. 187).” While it is usually not the preferred method, it 
is widely acknowledged that violence is inflicted as a last resort as the means to achieve political 
aims (Sharp, 1993; Held, 1997). Gene Sharp (2002), a political scientist and an advocate of non-
violence, sympathises with the frustration of the protesters given the lack of freedom of speech 
yet at the same time maintain that resorting to violence induces a vicious cycle whereby 
repressive regimes have an upper hand in stifling the opposition coalition with increasingly 
repressive measures. 
While the principles of sudden infliction of injury or harm are well taken, aggressions, 
depending on the context, muddy the principles of predictability and coercion, especially when 
justified as acts of ‘self-defence’. This is acute in light of the government’s response to the 
aftermath of the protester-riot police clashes
10
. Far be it from an autonomous power struggle 
targeting an individual, principles of recognition and intent fall within contentious grey areas 
when taking into account the scale of the conflict, actors involved, and conflicting political 
interests. Inevitably, identity-based political resistance in Bahrain is predisposed to biased 
thinking that exaggerates the in-group versus out-group distinction. 
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It can be surmised that the lack of consensus on the precise working definitions of 
violence and resistance, let alone the absence of a legally binding normative framework for 
arbitrating social justice suggests that the aforementioned notions of security, sectarian identity, 
and national identity are relativistic, multifaceted and socially constructed. In other words, ‘truth 
claims’ are contingent upon the eyes of the beholder. 
 
 
Children Rights to Protection and Participation 
 Participation rights of minors stoke up debate on their agency and political consciousness 
as children are physically and mentally in the formative stages of life. The term youth is often 
used interchangeably with adolescence, a concept referring to those in semi-dependent condition 
“that has evolved in its biological, psychological, and social implications, but with its most 
consequential evolution occurred in adult perceptions of the norms and behaviour of young 
people” (Chudacoff in eds. Fass, 2004, p. 15). Political participation of youth that in the form of 
aggression with subversive intent are viewed unfavourably since the norms and behaviours of 
young people in the mainstream sociology literature has traditionally been defined in terms of 
deviant subcultures or class-based resistance (Bucholtz, 2002). 
Because the concept of youth or adolescence alone already conjures up the idea of 
deviance, Bahraini youth and children’s agency is undermined, as they are to some extent 
perceived as unruly mobs for employing and defending tactical violence in ‘illegal gatherings’. 
This is in stark contrast to the depiction of women’s participation in the Bahraini uprising that is 
cast in a positive light as a liberating and empowering experience in Karolak’s article published 
in 2012. The political identity of Bahraini child protesters is stigmatised on two counts: for 
presumed prematurity of participation and the marginalisation of the Shiites on the political 
domain. Rising casualty and incarceration rate of minor protesters in Bahrain imply that political 
participation of children needs to be taken seriously and that human rights and citizenship 
education is critical for cultivating political consciousness and recognizing the rights to 
participation from an early age. 
Children, despite their physical and mental immaturity, are distinct from infants in the 
sense that they are capable of becoming agents for political change as they acquire rights in 
successive stages (Griffin, 2002). If political participation of children is not justified, it risks 
discrediting the agency of children. Recognition of rights is a precondition to agency, which 
gives them the authority to become decision-makers. Instead, “children are the objects of 
concern, not subjects in their own right. They are not represented: their views were not sought or 
known (Freeman, 2011, p.8 as cited in Flekkøy and Kaufman, 1997)”. This is acute given the 
claims that children in Bahrain are exploited as proxy agents of the legal guardians and/or the 
broader Shi’a community members. It is assumed that children are gullible and vulnerable as 
they have not reached the physical, social, and mental maturity to make conscious decisions. 
Therefore in light of the political unrest in Bahrain, there are apparent advantages for 
encouraging children to engage in civil disobedience for easily courting publicity. 
A re-visitation of Held’s definition of violence above highlights the principle of ‘coercion’ 
fuelling the speculation that youth and children are coerced by the guardians to burn tires, block 
roads with tree trunks, and throw Molotov cocktails to embolden the opposition cause. In 
response, Bahrain’s Ministry of Human Rights and Social Development officially released a 
statement urging the guardians to advise children to refrain from participating in violent protests. 
Seeing the eruption of violent protests, it is important to consider the legal age limits as a 
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measuring rod for defining childhood. Flekkøy and Kaufman (1997) highlight the utility of 
setting a legal age limit, namely for the sake of child protection and prosecution of criminal 
offense and voting. In particular, they contend that age marker is appropriate for determining 
rights by “setting upper limits for special entitlements and protection and the lower limits for 
attribution of responsibility (p. 14)”. To reiterate, in Bahrain’s case, the legal age for punishment 
is 15. 
Albeit a soft treaty, articles 5, 12, and 13 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child provide an insightful look at how family and community members can support 
children by directing and guiding child rights enshrined in the convention. While it is 
accentuated that direction and guidance fundamentally differ from determination and control in 
the sense that a child physically mature and capable of decision-making should be granted the 
right to fully exercise his or her rights, articles thirteen and fifteen invite disagreement. Article 
fifteen states that rights of the child to freedom of assembly should be honoured. Nevertheless, 
while the first clauses of both articles admit that a child is entitled to freedom of expression, the 
latter clause effectively annuls the preceding statute by relenting to ‘mitigating’ circumstances 
whereby it is subject to the restriction of “(a) for respect of the rights or reputations of others; or 
(b) for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals” 
(Flekkøy and Kaufman, 1997, p. 33). 
Even whilst Bahrain is a signatory of the UN convention of the rights of the child that 
advocates for child rights to freedom of speech, assemblage, and participation, Bahrain’s 
accession to the convention is futile given that it is a soft law that is subordinate to the national 
constitution that de facto trumps alternative forms of legislation. Therefore, in order for the 
ratified treaties to have the desired effect, Neumayer (2005) maintains that it has to be supported 
with democracy and a resilient civil society. When reflecting on this statement, political reform 
is necessary to mitigate the participation of children in violent protests. 
Interestingly, children’s rights embed a competing set of rights and values. Roger Hart, 
for instance, expounds on a generic notion of child rights that entails rights to free time and play, 
particularly for children in industrialised countries. He also goes on to point out that “it is 
unrealistic to expect them to suddenly become responsible, participating adult citizens at the age 
of 16, 18, 21 without prior exposure to the skills and responsibilities involved” (1992: p. 5). In 
Bahrain, this calls for an implementation of age-appropriate pedagogy that encourages inter-
subjective dialogue and builds upon the initiative for increasing awareness on human rights and 
citizenship rights. Accordingly, Hart’s reasoning posits that both parties have failed to recognise 
child’s rights: while the convention for the rights of the child is useful for establishing ground 
rules and meeting the bare minimum for honouring child rights, the treatment of legal guardians, 
community and family members is ambivalent in child rights treaties. 
Although Freeman (2011 as cited in Flekkøy and Kaufman, 1997) assumes that critics of 
children’s rights are purportedly defenders of parental rights, it is dubious that that is always the 
case especially when dealing with abusive parents. Despite the Lockean premise that presume 
that parents are vanguards of children’s welfare, validating their primary responsibility of raising 
them into rational beings, there exists an ethical dilemma regarding the exercise of parents’ 
authority over children without consent (Purdy, 1992). A case in point is when some parents put 
their child’s life at risk in return for political gains by enforcing coercive mechanisms. In such 
instances, child’s rights to safety is subordinate to political gains as children involuntarily 
become a political agent. The problem in the case of Bahrain is that it is not entirely clear how 
children are recruited to vandalize public properties, if not done voluntarily. What is more is that 
58 
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 14, No. 5  December 2013 
the UN convention is a soft treaty that does not give weight to any particular article or a clause, 
making it difficult to prioritise one article over another should circumstances arise that 
necessitates preponderance. As is the case elsewhere, the problem is that there is no consistency 
in applying children rights convention in Bahrain. 
While rights to free time and play are highly encouraged for children in industrialised 
countries, UNICEF International Child Development Centre report does not specify the 
benchmark and ignores socioeconomic disparity. ‘Industrialised country’ alone is not a reliable 
benchmark. Bahraini Shias, with the exception of the privileged few, protest against structural 
inequality that permeates economic and political discrimination. Moreover, what constitutes an 
infringement on child rights is open to debate due to existing cultural, economic, and political 
nuances that are easily ignored. Children’s rights are established on the Eurocentric notion of 
universal childhood is widely criticized as it is recognized that “UN convention on the rights of 
the child is contextualised in dominant western concepts. The convention refers to a universal, 
free-standing, individual child; a child who is on a particular developmental trajectory” (Mayall, 
2011, p. 432). 
In view of the controversy, Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy-of-needs theory provides a 
culturally sensitive and neutral approach in terms of identifying basic human needs. Maslow 
(1943) cites five motivational needs in his hierarchy-of-needs theory that bifurcates into 
deficiency and growth needs. According to Maslow’s model, basic needs at the lower hierarchy 
of the pyramid that include physiological needs and safety is superior to growth needs, such as 
social needs, esteem needs, and self-actualisation in the upper-half of the pyramid. 
In the case of Bahrain, children’s entitlement to rights to free speech is relegated to the 
backburner as the government’s heavy-handed clampdown on children protesters is justified on 
the grounds of defending vested interests in national security. The conditional clause appended to 
article fifteen in the constitution constrains formal political participation. Regardless of the moral 
and ethical controversies, the bottom line is that both parties are guilty for depriving children of 
their rights in view of article three of the convention that states, “The best interests of the child 
must be a top priority in all actions concerning children”. Article three is contentious for its 
ambiguous wording on dictating what is ‘best’ for children. 
Article five, part two of the national constitution provides a glimpse into the 
government’s stance on child rights: 
 
The family is the cornerstone of society and its strength lies in religion, morality, 
and patriotism. The law shall preserve its legal integrity and strengthen its bonds 
and values, and shall protect motherhood and childhood within the family. The 
law shall also protect the young and defend them against exploitation and moral, 
physical, and spiritual neglect. The state shall take particular care of the physical, 
mental, and moral growth of the youth (Bahrain eGovernment Portal, 2001).  
 
While the constitution formally recognises the imperative for moral, mental, and spiritual rights 
and rights to safety, to date, there has not been an implementation of social and/or educational 
policy to follow through the avowed pledges. The constitutional clause above does not clearly 
establish a working definition of childhood and motherhood that can potentially be implemented. 
Given the nebulousness, the agency of youth close to the borderline age of adulthood is 
not fully recognized and the extent to which the UN treaty or the national constitution speaks for 
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the interest of children. In any case, children’s rights to participation cannot be respected without 
ensuring safety. 
In light of Bahrain’s uprising, the dominant controversy is centred around the tension 
between the rights to safety and freedom of expression. Restraint of free speech demonstrated 
from the ban on public demonstrations and the Shi’a community’s widespread engagement with 
civil disobedience in effect pushes children to resort to violence to assert their rights. The 
problem stems from the fact that civil and political rights, regardless of age, are not clearly 
recognised as legitimate rights by all stakeholders involved. This is demonstrated by ambiguous 
wording of the exceptional clauses stipulated in the UN treaty and the national constitution and 
the criticisms surrounding the long-awaited Arab Human Rights Charter endorsed by the Arab 
League for not living up to expectations. 
Given the lack of consensus on what constitutes a right, perhaps it would be useful to 
clarify the distinction between positive and negative rights
11
. Erman (2005) points out that a 
government has the responsibility to protect the interests of the citizens while minimising direct 
state interference in respecting the rights to freedom of speech and religion. In the process, 
gauging the tolerable degree of state intervention is difficult. In Bahrain, protection of civil and 
political rights is commonly understood in terms of negative rights. Yet civil and political rights 
specific to children is hardly ever discussed nor recognised. Supporting the statement that 
“political ideologies are forming in adolescence when personal values, world views, and political 
attributions appear to be highly concordant” (Flanagan and Tucker, 1999 as cited in Flanagan, 
2008), promotion of children’s civic engagement through human rights education and other 
informal channels must be taken seriously. 
Considering that political participation has been studied within the confines of the 
institutional framework, Bamyeh advises that it should be studied from “surveying the subject in 
question, not the concept itself”. However, studying the subject in question has a strong bearing 
on subjectivity. Efforts to gain recognition for civil and political rights by children are both 
justified and un-justified on sectarian and violent grounds. Contrary to the misconception that 
playing the sectarian card benefits the government, I argue that it harms the political interests of 
contending parties, in addition to jeopardising national unity. The predominantly Shi’a 
movement of the uprising works against the opposition coalition by risking delegitimising the 
pro-democracy agenda; conversely, heavy-handed crackdown by the mercenaries of the Sunni 
sect entrenches existing sectarian discrimination. 
Inherently the tension between national security and civil and political rights reveals the 
underlying paradox that adds complexity to grasping what constitute child rights. As a result, 
human rights and principles of violence and non-violence is a matter of interpretation and 
subjectivity; it can be safely assumed that there exists no political monolith, and the rift between 
the rhetoric of national security and children human rights is simply projected as ‘truth claims’. 
 
 
Postmodern Approaches to Political Identity, Subjectivity, and Truth 
Flekkøy and Kaufman (1997) and the UN Convention for the Rights of the Child (1989) 
suggest that rights and responsibilities go hand-in-hand. They argue that rights can only be 
assured when adults assume responsibility for ensuring children’s rights to survival, protection, 
participation and self-expression. Upon reviewing articles 4, 19, 37 of the Children’s protection 
                                                             
11
 See also Morreall, John. "The Justifiability of Violent Civil Disobedience." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6.1 (1976) 35-
47. Print. 
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rights embedded in the UN Convention for the Rights of the Child that enshrines protection 
against all forms of violence, and detention and punishment, it is evident that right to child 
protection has been grossly violated by all sides. 
Bahraini minor protesters are caught between the rhetoric of sectarian geopolitics and the 
opposition engagement with violent civil disobedience. Regardless of political identities, all 
parties are perpetrators for relegating child rights on the backburner. Consequently, conflicting 
claims to universal human rights, namely natural rights and children’s rights, perpetuates the 
dialectics of human rights transgressions under the guise of identity politics. An inter-subjective 
discursive formation of identity politics and national sovereignty that support the claims and 
counterclaims against socio-political injustice and existential threat has deepened the political 
impasse. According to dialectic and totality in Hegelian thought, “the comprehension which 
became is at the same time again become a unity which must exhibit the movement in itself. But 
the development of the antithesis contained in it is not a mere dissolution into the moments 
where it had originated, but these moments have now another form through the fact that they 
have gone through the unity” (Hegel, 1869, p.369). The dialectic of human rights transgressions 
is reproduced on the accounts of the thesis and antithesis raised by the inter-group conflict. Yet 
conflicting accounts of sovereignty, allegiance, and social injustice obscure ‘the truth’; hence I 
contend that no objective truth can be found in the monolith of sectarianism or the pro-
democracy movement as they are belied by their respective engagements with violence. 
 As there is no monolith in unpacking the political crisis, I argue that the locus of power 
and truth is dictated by one’s political views. Amid escalating tensions, children are clearly the 
victims in the conflict. The protracted political crisis that institutionalizes ‘Shi’a uprising’ in 
Bahrain is intimately related to the notion that projects ‘power’ to be wielded by human subjects 
according to the structuralist assumption (Kelly, 2012). Since political reform cannot be attained 
unilaterally, a third way alternative to sectarian branding of political struggle is necessary to 
create an environment conducive for national dialogue. Insofar as national identity is concerned, 
a binary opposition is assumed between primordial ethnic attachments and modernism (Sökefeld, 
2001). However, primordial attachments themselves are arguably social constructs that are not 
autonomous of external influence. The case in Bahrain suggests that the disconnect between the 
official and unofficial discourses of nationalism promoted by the state and the opposition 
engenders a pluralistic discourses on national identities. 
To reconcile the political antagonisms of both parties, it is necessary to liberate the mind 
from in-group and out-group bias. Foucault advances a non-linear reading of power, truth, and 
knowledge. Foucauldian anti-humanist approach to human rights upholds the proposition of 
‘unfinished humanity’ that has an anti-essentialist outlook of humanity. In contradistinction to 
Para’s assertion that Foucault’s later work signals a radical break from his earlier 
poststructuralist project of the 1970s, Golder (2010) observes that “what Foucault offers us in 
these interventions, however, is less a humanist mea culpa than an ethic of critical engagement 
with human rights, with-in and against existing human rights, in the name of an unfinished 
humanity…it is precisely to the extent that Foucault’s anti-humanism remains militant that the 
promise of his critical engagement with human rights is sustained” (p. 356). In reference to 
Judith Butler (2004), he goes on to argue that human subjects in the Foucauldian sense are read 
as “the unfinished result of a political negotiation with and through others” (p. 357). Noting the 
glaring dissonance between human rights and politics, the incompatibility between the two 
concepts implies that there are limitations in upholding the notion of universal human rights. 
With divergent political ideologies driving a chasm between the government and the opposition, 
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an inter-subjective discursive formation should be propagated in the reading of Bahraini children 
as political subject. 
 To that end, the reading of human subject of minor protesters in Bahrain is treated 
primarily through political lens, as they are perceived in dichotomous terms either as deviant 
youth or political agents, terrorists or victims. According to Paden (1987), Humanism bifurcates 
into essentialist and explanatory assumptions; the former refers to unchanging features of a 
human subject whereas the latter adopts human nature that is bound to reason. Foucault refers to 
this explanatory form of human cognitive processes as follows: “the entry into objectivity of 
something that had long remained trapped within beliefs and philosophies was the effect of a 
change in the fundamental arrangements of knowledge…man is an invention of recent date. And 
one perhaps nearing its end ” (Foucault, 1973, p. 387 as cited in Paden, 1987). Further to this, he 
points out that Foucault challenges the humanistic notion of a ‘deep subject’ by surveying “the 
visible body and the surface rules of discourses and practices” (p.140). 
Maintaining the assumption that political identities are filtered through inter-subjective 
lens, human rights should transcend identity politics and look to educate human rights from a 
holistic perspective. Human rights should not be aimed at inculcating a narrow political agenda. 
Instead, it should be promoted as a neutral concept that transcends ethno-religious and national 
boundaries. While minor protesters in Bahrain are guilty of undermining national security by 
vandalising public properties, a closer scrutiny of civil disobedience of minors reveals that in 
reality, the accusation of an ‘act of terror’ overshadows the involvement of multiple parties. 
Therefore objectifying the labelling of political subjects as ‘terrorists’ oversimplifies the 
complexity of human rights transgressions and negates that upholding human rights entails 
responsibilities. Tetreault (2000) note that deprivation, rather than identity, should be the 
yardstick for assessing human rights in any society. Regardless of conflicting discourses, 
children’s right to protection, which is a form of deprivation that is understood as a negative 
right, has to be met as a precondition in order to advance the positive rights to participation of 
Bahraini minors. Hence the development of stable political societies and commitment to 
constitutionalism is a prerequisite to assuring respect for universal human rights since rights to 
freedom of expression, religious and ethnic equality, and the equality of women are met with 
deep resistance (Henkin, 1989). 
Advocating a holistic approach to human rights education is imperative to closely 
applying human rights as stipulated in international treaties and conventions. While the scope of 
the political uprising excludes the debate on citizenship, given the influx of migrant workers and 
expatriates in Bahrain
12
, the scope of human rights education should be broadened by giving due 
consideration to human rights that cuts across different ethno-religious backgrounds. Despite 
having recognized the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by all states as universal, the 
premise of universality that underlies human rights remains contentious due to the underlying 
positivist assumption of humanism. While the idea of universal human rights has a broad appeal, 
the actual challenge persists, however, in assuring human rights for all by commanding mutual 
respect and refraining from discriminatory practices based on ethnicity, religion, and nationality. 
Inevitably, respecting the rights of someone will end up in violating the rights of another. For 
that reason, human rights in this respect should be understood as a continual process of 
reassessment and renegotiation of a political subject. 
 
 
                                                             
12 Expatriate labourers amount to 65.7 percent in Bahrain (Ulrichsen, 2011).  
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Conclusion 
The rise in detention and casualty rates of Bahraini children are indicators that minors are 
victims of the discourse of identity politics, which has become a major impediment to countering 
the protracted political crisis. While the government is vindicating crackdowns on political 
protests by virtue of defending national security, the politically marginalized Shiite community 
and foreign mercenaries are entangled in a complex web of human rights violations. The conflict 
between the mercenaries and children is a complicated one, as article two of the universal 
declaration of human rights specifically stipulates that everyone is entitled “to all rights and 
freedoms without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”. For this reason, it is 
important to recognize that all parties involved are both transgressors and victims of human 
rights. Bearing in mind that political identity of a Bahraini child is far from a stable notion 
according to the anti-humanist tradition, children’s rights to protection, autonomous of externally 
imposed discursive formation of political identities, should be honoured in line with the premise 
of Maslow’s theory outlined above. The case of Bahrain shows that the reading of a subject in 
the political unrest hinges upon the surface rules of discourses and practices that is consistent 
with Paden’s idea. Furthermore, it shows that children’s rights are subsidiary to advancing a 
narrow political agenda. Irrespective of political identity, the bottom line is that every adult is 
responsible for promoting children’s rights in Bahrain by agreeing on establishing age-
appropriate protocols for political participation of minors while deterring them from engaging in 




Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 14, No. 5  December 2013 
References 
Anderson, Benedict.  Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso Books, 2006. Print. 
"Bahrain Child to be 'monitored' at Home - Middle East - Al Jazeera English." Al Jazeera 
English. Al Jazeera English, 05 July 2012. Web. 30 Oct. 2013. 
Bahrain. EGovernment Portal. Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain. N.p., 14 Feb. 2002. Web. 
<www.bahrain.bh/pubportal/wps/wcm/connect/.../CA9SS7XP.pdf>. 
"Bahrain: Trialing Children with Political Charges and Fears of Abuse." Web log post.Bahrain 
Youth Society for Human Rights. BYSHR, 30 Aug. 2012. Web. 
<http://byshr.org/?p=1157>. 
Bassiouni, Mahmoud Cherif, Nigel Rodley, Badria Al-Awadhi, and Mahnoush H. Arsanjani. 
Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry. Rep. N.p.: BICI, 2011. Web. 
<http://www.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf>. 
Beitz, Charles R. "Social and Cosmopolitan Liberalism." International Affairs 75.3 (1999): 515-
29. Wiley. Web. 
---. "Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice." The Journal of Ethics 9.1 (2005): 11-27. Print. 
Belfer, Mitchell A. "Iran's Bahraini Ambitions." The Wall Street Journal 6 Oct. 2011. Web. 23 
June 2013. 
Black, Ian. "Bahrain Security Forces Accused of Deliberately Recruiting Foreign Nationals." The 
Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 17 Feb. 2011. Web. 30 Oct. 2013. 
"Bloodshed Triggers UK Rethink over Arms to Bahrain: Four Dead as Riot Police Launch Brutal 
Crackdown on Peaceful Protesters." Mail Online. N.p., 18 Feb. 2011. Web. 30 Oct. 2013. 
Bucholtz, Mary. "Youth and Cultural Practice." Annual Review of Anthropology 31 (2002): 525-
52. Print. 
Chudacoff, Howard P.  Encyclopedia of Children and Childhood: In History and Society. Ed. 
Paula S. Fass. 2003. Print. 
Cleveland, William L., and Martin Bunton. A History of the Modern Middle East. 5th ed. 
Boulder: Westview Press, 2013. Print. 
Cohen, Jean L. "Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and Sovereignty in the Age of 
Globalization." Political Theory 36.4 (2008): 578-606. Print. 
Cole, Wade M. "Hard and Soft Commitments to Human Rights Treaties, 1966-
2000."Sociological Forum 24.3 (2009): 563-88. Web. 
Downs, Kevin. "A Theoretical Analysis of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry in Bahrain." Journal of 
Politics & International Studies 8 (2012): 203-37. Print. 
Dryzek, John S. "Transnational Democracy in an Insecure World." International Political 
Science Review 27.2 (2006): 101-19. Print. 
Erman, Eva. Human Rights and Democracy: Discourse Theory and Global Rights Institutions. 
Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005. Print. 
Falk, Richard. "Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia." The Journal of Ethics 6.4 
(2002): 311-52. Print. 
Flanagan, C .A. & Tucker, C. J.  (1999). Adolescents' explanations for political issues: 
Concordance with their views of self and society. Developmental Psychology, 35 (5), 
1198-1209. 
Flekkøy, Målfrid Grude, and Natalie Hevener Kaufman. The participation rights of the child 
rights and responsibilities in family and society. London: Kingsley, 1997. Print. 
64 
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 14, No. 5  December 2013 
Gause, F. Gregory. Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States. 
New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994. Print. 
Golder, Ben. "Foucault and the Unfinished Human of Rights." Law, Culture, and the Humanities 
6.3 (2010): 354-74. Web. 
Green, Daniel. Constructivism and comparative politics. London: M.E. Sharpe, 2002. Print. 
Griffin, James. "Do Children Have Rights?" The Moral and Political Status of Children. Ed. 
David Archard. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Print. 
Hart, R. (1992). Children’s Participation from Tokenism to Citizenship. Florence: UNICEF 
Innocenti Research Centre, as cited in www.freechild.org/ladder.htm 
Hassassian, Manuel. "Palestinian Political Culture, Civil Society, and the Conception of 
Citizenship." Ed. Uri Davis and Manuel Hassassian. Citizenship and the State in the 
Middle East: Approaches and Applications. Ed. Nils A. Butenschon. Syracuse: Syracuse 
UP, 2000. 246-62. Print. 
Hegel, Georg W.F. "Hegel's First Principle." The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 3.4 (1869): 
344-71. Web. 
Held, Virginia. "The Media and Political Violence."Springer. 1.2 (1997): 187-202. Web. 23 Jun. 
2013. 
Henkin, Louis. "The Universality of the Concept of Human Rights." Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 506 (1989): 10-16. Web. 
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968. Print. 
Hollander, Jocelyn A., and Rachel L. Einwohner. "Conceptualizing Resistance." Sociological 
Forum. 19.4 (2004): 533-554. Web. 23 Jun. 2013. 
Hvistendahl, Mara. "Young and Restless Can Be a Volatile Mix." Science Magazine. AAAS, 29 
July 2011. 
"In Harm’s Way – Bahraini Children Jailed in Adult Prisons." Online posting. Amnesty 
International. N.p., 31 May 2013. Web. <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/harm-s-way-
bahraini-children-jailed-adult-prisons-2013-05-31>. 
Jones, Sandy Russell. "The Battle over Family Law in Bahrain." Middle East Research and 
Information Project (MERIP). 242 (2007): 33-9. Web. 23 Jun. 2013 
Karolak, Magdalena (2012). Bahraini Women in the 21st Century: Disputed Legacy of the 
Unfinished Revolution. Journal of International Women's Studies, 13(5), 5-16. Available 
at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol13/iss5/3 
Kelly, Mark G.E. The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault. 1st ed. N.p.: Routledge, 2010. 
Print. 
Kinninmont, Jane. Bahrain: Beyond the Impasse. Rep. London: Chatham House, 2013. Web. 23 
June 2013. 
Krasner, Stephen D. "Compromising Westphalia." International Security 20.3 (1995-6): 115-51. 
Print. 
Longva, Anh Nga. Walls built on sand: migration, exclusion, and society in Kuwait.  Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1997. Print. 
Maclean, William, and Jason Webb. "Bahrain Says Arrests Eight on "terror-related" Charges." 
Online posting. Reuters. N.p., 17 Feb. 2013. Web.  
Maslow, Abraham H. A Theory of Human Motivation. N.p.: Tree of Knowledge, 2013. Print. 
Mayall, Berry. "The Sociology of Childhood in Relation to Children’s Rights." The International 
Journal of Children's Rights 8 (2000): 243-59. Print. 
65 
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 14, No. 5  December 2013 
McLeod, John. Beginning Postcolonialism. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000. 
Print. 
Nasr, Vali. "When the Shiites Rise." Foreign Affairs 85.4 (2006): 58-71. Print. 
---. The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 2007. Print. 
Neumayer, Eric. "Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights." 
Journal of Conflict Resolution. 49.6 (2005): 925-953. Print. 
Paden, Roger. "Foucault's Anti-Humanism." Human Studies 10.1 (1987): 123-41. Web. 
Purdy, Laura M. In Their Best Interest? The Case Against Equal Rights for Children. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1992. Print. 
Putzel, James. "Globalization, Liberalization, and Prospects for the State." International Political 
Science Review 26.1 (2005): 5-16. Print. 
Right to Education Project. Rep. CRC, 23 July 2001. Web. <http://www.right-to-
education.org/country-node/300/country-minimum>. 
Shabazz, Tariq. "Bahrain: Child Protesters given 10 Years in Prison." Web log post.Amnesty 
International UK/Blogs: Children's Human Rights Network. Amnesty International, 04 
Oct. 2013. Web. <http://www2.amnesty.org.uk/blogs/childrens-human-rights-
network/bahrain-child-protesters-given-10-years-prison>. 
Sharp, Gene. From Dictatorship to Democracy. East Boston: Albert Einstein Institution, 2002. 
Print. 
Sökefeld, Martin. "Reconsidering Identity." Reconsidering Identity (2001): 527-44. Print. 
"Teenage Boy Killed in Clash with Police in Bahrain." BBC News. BBC, 18 Aug. 2012. Web. 30 
Oct. 2013 
T treault, Mary Ann. Stories of Democracy: Politics and Society in Contemporary Kuwait. New 
York: Columbia UP, 2000. Print. 
Ulrichsen, Kristian C. The Transformation of the Gulf : Politics, Economics and the Global 
Order. London: Routledge, 2010. Print. 
---. After the Arab Spring: power shift in the Middle East?: Bahrain’s aborted revolution. 
IDEAS reports - special reports, Kitchen, Nicholas (ed.) SR011. LSE IDEAS, London 
School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK, 2012. Web. 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Publication. UNICEF, 1999. Web. 
<www.unicef.org.uk/UNICEFs-Work/Our-mission/UN-Convention> 
 
